# Recent talks

## March 2024

Why Be a Height Potentialist?; Challenging the Infinite, University of Oxford

## January 2024

“The Metalinguistic Construal of Mathematical Propositions”; The New York Philosophy of Language Workshop, NYU

## September 2023

Why Be a Potentialist?; Actualism and Potentialism Conference; University of Konstanz

## May 2023

“An Epistemic Role for Opinion Journalism”; VICTR; University of Connecticut (online)

## April 2023

“The Metalinguistic Construal of Mathematical Propositions”; Logic Colloquium; Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, University of California, Berkeley

## March 2023

“The problem of existence for descriptivism about the reference of set-theoretic expressions”; The Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy; Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University

## February 2023

“Descriptivism about mathematical language”; Departmental Colloquium; Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh

## December 2022

“The Role of Questions, Circumstances, and Algorithms in Belief” (with Jens Kipper and Alexander W. Kocurek); Amsterdam Colloquium

## October 2022

“Idle Questions” (with Jens Kipper and Alexander W. Kocurek); The Creighton Club, University of Syracuse

## June 2022

“The Metalinguistic Construal of Mathematical Propositions”; Convention in Logic and Language Conference; University of Haifa

## March 2022

“Fixing Mathematical Content”; Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar; Oxford University (online)

## January 2022

“An Algorithmic Model of the Middle Ground Between Logical Omniscience and Incompetence”; Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar; University of Konstanz (online)

## October 2021

“A Metalinguistic and Computational Approach to the Problem of Mathematical Omniscience”; Particularity and Generality in Mind Workshop 2021; Umeå University (online)

## June 2021

“A Metalinguistic and Computational Approach to the Problem of Mathematical Omniscience”; London Group for Formal Philosophy; UCL (online)

## May 2021

“Anchoring the Content of the Concept of Set”; Philosophy of Set Theory Seminar; UNICAMP and University of Konstanz (online)

## June 2020

Workshop on Internal Categoricity; University of Helsinki (Postponed to May 2022)

## March 2020

“A Kripkean Argument for Descriptivism”; Cornell University

## October 2019

“Why Is the Universe of Sets Not a Set”; LOPSE Seminar Series; University of Gdansk

## August 2019

“Independence and Metasemantics”; CLMPST; Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

## February 2019

“Intended Interpretations in Mathematics: Revisiting Putnam’s Paradox”; Future of Liberal Naturalism Conference; Center for the History and Philosophy of Science; Boston University

## November 2018

“Do Independent Sentences Have Truth-Values?”; Department of Mathematics; University of Rochester

## June 2018

“Intended Interpretations of Formal Systems”; Formal Methods in Philosophy: Truth, Paradox, and Mathematics Workshop; Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)

## March 2018

“Relative Analyticity”; Vienna Forum for Analytic Philosophy

## January 2018

“From Metasemantics to Analyticity and Beyond”; Logic Colloquium; Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)

## June 2017

“Independence and Metasemantics”; Set Theoretic Pluralism Symposium; University of Bristol

“Analyticity in Set Theory”; Workshop on Conceptual Truth, Analyticity, and Conceptual Competence; ConceptLab; University of Oslo