Departmental Colloquium; Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science; University of California, Irvine
Departmental Colloquium; Department of Philosophy; University of Texas at Austin
Logic Colloquium; University of Connecticut Logic Group; University of Connecticut
Departmental Colloquium; Department of Philosophy; University of Massachusetts, Amherst
“The Metalinguistic Construal of Mathematical Propositions”; Departmental Colloquium; Department of Philosophy; MIT
Why Be a Height Potentialist?; Challenging the Infinite; University of Oxford
“The Metalinguistic Construal of Mathematical Propositions”; The New York Philosophy of Language Workshop; NYU
An Invariance Account of the A Priori (with Jens Kipper); The A Priori in Miami; University of Miami
Why Be a Potentialist?; Actualism and Potentialism Conference; University of Konstanz
“An Epistemic Role for Opinion Journalism”; VICTR; University of Connecticut (online)
“The Metalinguistic Construal of Mathematical Propositions”; Logic Colloquium; Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science; University of California, Berkeley
“The problem of existence for descriptivism about the reference of set-theoretic expressions”; The Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy; Department of Philosophy; Uppsala University
“Descriptivism about mathematical language”; Departmental Colloquium; Department of Philosophy; University of Pittsburgh
“The Role of Questions, Circumstances, and Algorithms in Belief” (with Jens Kipper and Alexander W. Kocurek); Amsterdam Colloquium
“Idle Questions” (with Jens Kipper and Alexander W. Kocurek); The Creighton Club; University of Syracuse
“The Metalinguistic Construal of Mathematical Propositions”; Convention in Logic and Language Conference; University of Haifa
“Fixing Mathematical Content”; Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar; Oxford University (online)
“An Algorithmic Model of the Middle Ground Between Logical Omniscience and Incompetence”; Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar; University of Konstanz (online)
“A Metalinguistic and Computational Approach to the Problem of Mathematical Omniscience”; Particularity and Generality in Mind Workshop 2021; Umeå University (online)
“A Metalinguistic and Computational Approach to the Problem of Mathematical Omniscience”; London Group for Formal Philosophy; UCL (online)
“Anchoring the Content of the Concept of Set”; Philosophy of Set Theory Seminar; UNICAMP and University of Konstanz (online)
Workshop on Internal Categoricity; University of Helsinki (Postponed to May 2022)
“A Kripkean Argument for Descriptivism”; Cornell University
“Why Is the Universe of Sets Not a Set”; LOPSE Seminar Series; University of Gdansk
“Independence and Metasemantics”; CLMPST; Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
“Intended Interpretations in Mathematics: Revisiting Putnam’s Paradox”; Future of Liberal Naturalism Conference; Center for the History and Philosophy of Science; Boston University
“Do Independent Sentences Have Truth-Values?”; Department of Mathematics; University of Rochester
“Intended Interpretations of Formal Systems”; Formal Methods in Philosophy: Truth, Paradox, and Mathematics Workshop; Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
“Relative Analyticity”; Vienna Forum for Analytic Philosophy
“From Metasemantics to Analyticity and Beyond”; Logic Colloquium; Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP)
“Independence and Metasemantics”; Set Theoretic Pluralism Symposium; University of Bristol
“Analyticity in Set Theory”; Workshop on Conceptual Truth, Analyticity, and Conceptual Competence; ConceptLab; University of Oslo